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1. Executive summary 
An attempt in 2002 to reform the Ontario electricity industry by introducing competition and a greater role 
for the private sector failed within six months because prices increased sharply. New reform proposals were 
announced by the Liberal Ontario Energy Minister in June 2004. This paper reviews these proposals and 
comments on their likely impact. 
Under the new proposals, the key body would be a new Ontario Power Authority, which would be required 
to monitor supply and demand and, where necessary, intervene to commission the construction of new 
facilities to ensure supply security. The wholesale market would continue and retail competition would be re-
introduced. The network company, Hydro One and the publicly-owned generator, Ontario Power Generation 
(OPG) would continue but OPG would be heavily constrained from contributing to the construction of new 
capacity. 
About 24,000MW of new (or refurbished) generating capacity is expected to be needed by 2020 primarily 
because nearly all the nuclear capacity (14,000MW) will need to be refurbished or retired and because the 
new Liberal government has decided to close Ontario’s coal-fired plant (about 7500MW) by 2007. More 
than half of this plant need will be before 2010 so urgent decisions and preparations need to be taken on the 
nuclear plants and on the mechanism for new plant construction if Ontario is not to suffer significant 
capacity shortages. Experience elsewhere, especially Europe, suggests new capacity will be primarily gas-
fired. This raises issues about the adequacy of gas resources available to North America to sustain a 
significant increase in demand from new gas-fired stations. 
It seems likely that few, if any non-Canadian companies will be interested in building plants in Ontario and 
careful assessment is needed to ensure Canadian companies can meet the required investment need, 
especially if OPG is not allowed to participate. While the proposals imply new investment will primarily be 
provided by the market, it seems likely that investors will prefer to wait till a capacity shortage is forecast by 
the Ontario Power Authority. The Power Authority will then be forced to run a competition to build new 
capacity and will award the winning bids long-term contracts. 
Unless existing generators can be forced to guarantee they will not exit the market and new generators are 
forced to stick to their forecast construction schedules, it will be difficult if not impossible for the Power 
Authority to forecast capacity availability in order to identify plant need in time for new capacity to be built. 
The situation is complicated by the NAFTA and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) 
agreements. The terms and implications of these agreements are far from clear, but under both agreements, 
once a sector is opened up, it will effectively be impossible to go back to a planned approach no matter how 
disastrous the results of failed reforms. The NAFTA agreement also does not allow restrictions on trade, so 
even if Ontario nominally has enough capacity to meet demand, if prices are higher elsewhere, this capacity 
might not be available to Ontario. 
It is difficult to predict the impact of the new capacity needed on prices, but the more competitive the 
environment, the higher the risk will be for new investment and this will be reflected in the cost of capital for 
new construction, perhaps doubling it. Given that for all power plants, repaying capital is a major element in 
the overall cost of power, doubling this cost is likely to push up the cost of power. Preventing OPG, which is 
likely to have a low cost of capital from participating, will only exacerbate this effect. 
The Ontario government has begun to test the new system by issuing a Request for Proposals for 2500MW 
of ‘clean’ power and 300MW of clean capacity, including demand side measures. These will provide 
valuable information on what companies will be interested in investing in Ontario, what terms they will 
require, and what the completion rate of successful proposals is. There is a significant risk that interest will 
not be very great, that investors will require fully guaranteed income and that a significant proportion of the 
successful bidders will not complete their plants or will complete them later than forecast. This places further 
doubt on the efficacy of the proposed new system. 
Outside Canada, retail electricity competition has generally been welcomed by large users, who have the 
resources and incentives to exploit the market potential to the full. Small consumers are either not interested 
in switching or, as in Britain, they appear not to be able to identify the cheapest deal. This makes it easy for 
retail suppliers to exploit small consumers and save their best prices for more price-sensitive large users. 
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It is concluded that Ontario faces a heavy investment requirement in the electricity sector over the next 6-8 
years. To abandon the old publicly owned monopoly model, which, despite some faults, has a good record of 
ensuring supply security over many decades, in favour of a model with at best, a mixed track record seems 
unduly risky. It is recommended that: 
• The attempt to introduce wholesale electricity competition is abandoned in favour of a more planned 
approach that ensures Ontario has enough capacity to meet its own needs; 
• A review of gas resources available to Ontario be carried out if it is expected that a significant 
proportion of new plant is expected to be gas-fired; 
• Clarification should be sought on the implications of the NAFTA and GATS agreements. Because of 
the impossibility of reversing commitments, none should be made under GATS and all possible 
protections taken under NAFTA until it is clear that the model adopted for Ontario is viable; 
• Attempts to introduce retail competition should be abandoned because of their likely adverse impact 
on small consumers; 
• The government should not attempt to privatise Hydro One and OPG and should allow OPG a much 
greater role in building new capacity, including ensuring it has the financial resources necessary; and 
• Decisions are urgently needed on the future of the coal and nuclear plants. Retaining the coal plants 
at least for a little longer than is currently planned may help smooth the demand for new generating 
capacity, while many of the nuclear plants will soon need to be either refurbished or closed. 
Decisions on these matters should be taken by the Ontario people through clear, democratic 
processes. 
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2. Introduction 
Ontario’s Conservative government implemented full wholesale and retail competition in May 2002, but just 
six months later was forced to suspend retail competition for most consumers, capping prices and refunding 
excessive charges when price spikes caused a public outcry. The previous government's plan was also 
criticized because it did not encourage the development of new generating capacity, leaving the province 
with the prospect of capacity shortfalls. In June 2004, the Liberal Ontario Minister of Energy, Dwight 
Duncan, announced a new proposal for an ‘Electricity Restructuring Act’ to the Ontario Legislature. This 
paper reviews these proposals and comments on their likely impact. 
3. The proposals 
The key body in these proposals appears to be the Ontario Power Authority, a public body, at arms length 
from government, expected to be set up in January 2005. The Ontario Power Authority will have the 
responsibility to monitor supply and demand and, where appropriate, to commission the construction of new 
supply and demand facilities1. The Ontario Power Authority would be required to set up an energy 
conservation bureau. The wholesale electricity market would continue, largely unchanged and choice of 
retail supplier would be available to all consumers, although small and domestic consumers would be able to 
choose a regulated tariff. 
Other changes will only have a limited impact on the construction of new power plants. The Independent 
Electricity Market Operator (IMO) will be renamed the Independent Electricity System Operator and the 
responsibility for monitoring for market abuses will be transferred from the IMO to the economic regulatory 
body, the Ontario Energy Board. 
The government has pledged to increase incentives for energy efficiency and for renewable sources. It is 
clear that such measures will require strong government support and the use of public funds to support them. 
The ‘market’ will not provide these unprompted. 
As a first step to stimulating the construction of new capacity and energy efficiency, in June 2004, the 
Ontario government announced it would be launching a Request for Proposals (RFP) for 300MW of ‘green’ 
(renewable) capacity and for 2500MW of ‘clean’ capacity (not oil or coal), either new generation or demand 
side measures.2 The bids that offer the lowest costs, making up 300MW and the 2500MW will be awarded 
contracts that are guaranteed to cover the bid costs.3 OPG will not be allowed to participate in the ‘green’ 
RFP and will be heavily restricted in its role in any bids for the ‘clean’ capacity. 
4. The previous reforms 
In 2002, the Ontario electricity market was opened to competition with the introduction of a wholesale spot 
market and, from May 1, the launch of retail competition for all consumers. Small consumers could either 
purchase from a competitive retailer (about 1 million of Ontario's 4.4-million retail customers chose this 
option) or ‘standard supply service’ (SSS) from their local distribution utility. Those that chose the latter paid 
rates based on the fluctuating price in the Ontario wholesale market. In 1999, in preparation for this, the 
integrated company, Ontario Hydro, owned by the province of Ontario was split into a network company, 
Hydro One and a generating company, Ontario Power Generation (OPG). Measures were introduced to break 
the dominance of OPG in generation partly through plant sales, for example, the Mississagi River system 
                                                     
1 This appears to include both generation and transmission facilities, although in this document, we concentrate on 
generation facilities. 
2 Details of the Requests for Proposals can be found at http://www.ontarioelectricityrfp.ca/Index.aspx  
3 The website for the RFP states for the 2500MW RFP that: ‘The goal of the Economic Evaluation is to choose, from 
among the Proposals that have met the minimum technical and financial requirements, the Proposals for: New 
Generating Facilities and DR Projects with the lowest total Evaluated Costs in Dollars per MW-month; and DSM 
Projects that, on the basis of the Total Resource Cost Test, are demonstrated to be cost-effective.’ For the 300MW RFP, 
the criterion will be: ‘The Ministry will select Successful Proponents starting with the lowest Proposal Price, proceeding 
to the one ranking second lowest, and continuing to select according to the ranking of Proposals by Proposal Price until 
the total RES Contract Capacity of the selected Proposals adds up to as close to 300 MW as possible, provided that this 
limit may be exceeded under the circumstances set forth in Section III.H.’ 
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was sold to Brascan in 2002 and partly through leasing facilities, for example, the Bruce nuclear power plant 
was leased to a consortium known as Bruce Power in 2001. However, plans to privatise Hydro One failed 
and OPG still remains the dominant generator in the province4. The distribution sector, previously dominated 
by municipal companies was not restructured but the municipal companies were turned into ‘for-profit’ 
companies with the opportunity to privatise or part-privatise. 
By November 2002, after a series of price spikes, which saw retail rates nearly double in the peak-demand 
summer months, the Ontario government suspended the retail market. They capped the price small 
consumers paid at 4.3 cents per kWh and refunded amounts paid over that price cap level. The privatisation 
of Hydro One was stopped. In March 2004, the price cap was raised to 4.7 cents per kWh for the first 750 
kWh and 5.5 cents for energy used above that. 
5. Is the investment requirement real? 
A primary justification for the new reforms is the need to finance new power stations to meet growth and to 
replace old plants, and to finance refurbishment of some existing nuclear power stations. The proposals 
assume that by 2020, 18,000MW out of the 30,000MW currently in service will have to be replaced or 
refurbished and that demand growth will require a further 6400MW to be built. The proposals imply this is 
an exceptional requirement that will be difficult to finance. It is therefore important first to establish whether 
this requirement is real. 
The installed capacity in Ontario is about 30,000MW. The largest source of generation is nuclear power, 
accounting for about half the capacity (15,000MW including capacity not currently in service) and, if all 
units were in service, these would produce much more than half the generation. The rest is divided between 
fossil-fuel plants (about 10,000MW) and hydro-electric plants (about 7000MW). 
5.1. The nuclear plants 
Ontario has three nuclear power stations, Pickering, Bruce and Darlington comprising a total of 20 units. 
These, especially Pickering and Bruce, have had a problematic history in the last 15 years, with eight of the 
units closed for six years or more.5 Ontario Power Generation (the publicly-owned generation company spun 
off from Ontario Hydro in 1999) operates the Pickering and Darlington stations. Pickering A consists of four 
units (542MW) completed from 1971-73. These four units were out of service for a lengthy period from the 
mid-90s onwards. One unit (unit 4) returned to service in September 2003, and in July 2004 a decision was 
taken to refurbish a second (unit 1) with a view to restarting it in September 2005. The budgeted cost is 
C$900m. A decision on whether the other two units should be brought back into service has not been taken 
yet. The cost of the refurbishment has escalated from an estimated C$1.1bn to refurbish all four units and the 
first unit alone cost about C$1.25bn. If refurbishment is completed, it might be expected that the plants could 
be regarded as essentially new, with an operating life beyond 2020. 
Pickering B (four units of 540MW) was completed from 1983-86 and has remained in service without the 
lengthy shutdowns that have affected other plants. If it is to remain in service beyond 2020, it will need a 
major refurbishment before then. Darlington (four units of 935MW) was completed from 1990-93 and has 
not suffered a long-term shutdown. It is likely the units would need to be refurbished (assuming a life-time of 
about 25 years before refurbishment was needed) at around 2020 to remain in service beyond then. 
The Bruce station has also been problematic. The plants were built by Ontario Hydro and were then passed 
on to its de-integrated successor company, Ontario Power Generation. In 2001, OPG leased the station to a 
consortium known as Bruce Power, with the privatised British nuclear company, British Energy, as the 
majority shareholder with 82.4 per cent. The lease runs to 2018 with an option to extend for a further 25 
years. The remainder of the stock was held by Cameco and by Bruce staff organizations - the Power 
Workers' Union and The Society of Energy Professionals. In February 2003, financial difficulties with its 
UK operations forced British Energy to sell its stake. Now Cameco and two other Canadian companies 
                                                     
4 The attempt to sell Hydro One failed when an Ontario court found that the government had not given itself the legal 
authority to sell it. The attempt to sell several coal-fired generating plants was blocked due to environmental concerns. 
5 The units were closed as part of plan to improve performance and bring all Bruce and Pickering reactors back to 
operation - it was decided to shut these eight units down so that the other eight units at Pickering and Bruce could be 
concentrated on. 
23/08/2004  Page 6 of 21  
  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
TransCanada Pipelines, of Calgary, and BPC Generation Infrastructure Trust, of Toronto (a pension fund), 
each owns 31.6 per cent of the shares with the staff organisations doubling their stake to 5.2 per cent. 
Bruce A (four units of 904MW) was completed from 1977-79. Unit 2 was damaged in an equipment failure 
in 1995 and would need major repair work to bring it back into service. Unit 1 has been down since 1997 and 
Bruce Power is studying what measures would be necessary to bring it and unit 2 back into service. Units 3 
and 4 were out of action from 1998-2003 but have now been returned to service but without major 
refurbishment and can only operate for another 5-8 years without further repairs. To operate beyond 2020 
they will need major refurbishment. Bruce B (four units of 915MW) was completed from 1984-87 and would 
need major refurbishment to run beyond 2020. 
The nuclear capacity available after 2020 is hard to estimate. At the lower end of the scale, only the two units 
at Pickering A (total capacity of about 1000MW) have a high probability of being in service while at the 
upper end, all existing plants could still be in service with a capacity of about 15,300MW. Decisions on 
refurbishment are controversial and refurbishment is costly, probably more than the cost of building new 
gas-fired capacity, but cheaper than new nuclear plants. 
5.2. Nuclear refurbishment 
The key components determining when refurbishment of the nuclear units must be undertaken if the unit is 
not to be retired are the fuel-containing pressure tubes. These are expected to have a life of 20-25 years. Re-
tubing is technically well-established having been first done in the mid-80s. The time taken for this job will 
vary from unit to unit depending on what other repairs or upgrades are required, but it may be prudent to plan 
for an average of 18 months per unit. The job is demanding and it may also be sensible not to have more than 
three units under repair at any one time to ensure technical resources are not over-stretched. This means that 
if all the nuclear units are to be in service beyond 2020, 18 units will have to be refurbished over and above 
Pickering A units 1 & 4 where refurbishment is underway or completed. 
In fact, if we assume a tube life of 22-23 years, decisions will have to have been taken to either close or 
refurbish 14 of the 18 units by about 2010. This has two important consequences. First, it means that there 
will be an additional plant requirement of about 2500MW to replace the output of the nuclear plants, either 
temporarily or permanently. Second, decisions must be taken very soon on the future of the nuclear plants, 
putting in place resources for refurbishment if that is the decision or permanently replacing the capacity.  
5.3. Fossil plants 
OPG owns approximately 9700MW of fossil fuel plants, with four stations in Southern Ontario accounting 
for the bulk of this. Lambton (1975MW, completed 1970), Nanticoke (3920MW, completed 1972-78), and 
Lakeview (1140MW, completed 1969, but slated to close April 2005) are coal-fired plants, while Lennox 
(2000MW) is dual oil/gas fired. The new Liberal government has pledged to close the coal-fired power 
plants by 2007, removing about 8000MW of generating capacity. In principle, fossil-fuel power stations of 
this type have an indefinite life-time: all the major items of equipment are reasonably replaceable. However, 
the determining factor for the life-time of such a plant is the cost of maintenance and repairs, the price of 
power and also the environmental acceptability of such plants. Nevertheless, by 2020, the coal plants will be 
about 50 years old and it seems likely that cleaner, more efficient coal-fired technology will then be 
available. The decision whether to retire these plants, maintain them in service or replace them with more 
coal plants therefore has a large political as well as economic element. 
5.4. Hydro-electric plants 
Ontario has a capacity of about 7000MW of hydro-electric plants. The expected life-time of hydro-electric 
plants is much longer than nuclear or fossil-fuel plants and most and perhaps all of this capacity can be 
assumed to be in service still in 2020 without huge expenditures. While a decision to build new hydro-
electric plant would probably raise significant environmental issues, maintaining existing plants does not. 
5.5. Demand growth 
The projected growth in demand is relatively modest, a little over 1 per cent per year, and is not the main 
cause of the demand for new plant. Such a low demand growth rate is likely only to be possible if a very 
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effective energy efficiency programme, the responsibility of the new Ontario Power Authority, is carried 
through. 
5.6. Overall plant demand 
The main uncertainty in the period to 2020 is policy towards life-extending the nuclear plants. If no further 
life-extension is carried out (but refurbished plants are allowed to continue), only 1000MW of nuclear 
capacity will remain, whereas if all plants are refurbished, about 15,300MW will still be in service. By 2020, 
all the existing conventional fossil-fired stations are likely to be retired, but all the hydro capacity should 
remain in service. Assuming a need for 6400MW of capacity to meet demand growth, the range of needs for 
new plant is about 18,000-28,000MW. So the Ontario government’s forecast that about 24,000MW of new 
and refurbished capacity will be required in the period to 2020 seems plausible provided the assumptions on 
nuclear plant and coal-fired plant, and demand growth are accepted. 
However, in the shorter term, if the coal-fired plants (7500MW) are shut by 2007, if the nuclear plants off-
line (2900MW) now are not quickly brought back into service and if demand grows at 400MW a year 
(1200MW), about half of the overall plant demand will arise in the next three or four years. Capacity is now 
about 30,000MW and peak demand is about 25,000MW, so if we assume a 20 per cent margin is necessary 
to maintain secure supplies and we do not assume imports from the USA and other provinces will be 
available at peak times, there is little surplus plant at present. Building about 13,000MW in the period 2008-
2020 (about 1000MW per year) should not prove problematic but building 3500MW a year for the next three 
or four years would be a severe challenge under any regime. Reliance on the availability of large-scale 
imports from the USA does not appear a prudent plan. It may be necessary, whatever solution is chosen for 
the generation market, to reconsider the coal retirements, clarify the position on nuclear refurbishment and 
accelerate demand-side measures to smooth the demand for new capacity. 
6. What are the options for new capacity? 
In all European markets where the generation sector has been opened up and new capacity built, this new 
capacity has been almost invariably been gas-fired except where subsidies or guarantees have been 
introduced and ‘dashes for gas’ have occurred in Britain, Spain and Italy. The reasons for this dominance of 
gas are the short construction times, the low construction costs, the relatively good environmental 
performance and the low technological risks. 
However, the long-term gas resource context in Europe is very different to that of North America. Europe 
has a number of major gas producers, such as Norway, the Netherlands and the UK and is surrounded by 
regions with vast gas reserves, such as Russia and the other former Soviet countries, the North African 
countries, and the Middle East. More than 80 per cent of the world’s gas reserves are readily accessible, from 
a physical point of view, to European markets. These resources are generally in countries with strong 
economic incentives to sell as much gas as possible. There are political issues about the security of gas 
supplies to Europe, but so far supplies have always been maintained despite political instability in producing 
countries and there is little doubt that Europe can readily access decades of gas. In North America, resources 
currently available are much less clearly capable of sustaining a growing demand for many decades.6 
Of the other options, it would clearly be illogical to close the old coal plants on environmental grounds only 
to replace them with new coal plants. Building new nuclear plants is not attractive in a competitive market 
because of the high construction costs, the technological risks and the economic and physical inflexibility of 
the plants. Renewables and large scale hydro-electric plants are also unlikely to flourish in a competitive 
market without strong government backing. 
If the generation market is opened, as in Europe, gas-fired plant is likely to dominate, but unlike Europe, it is 
far from clear that North America has the gas resource base to sustain sharply increased gas use for several 
decades. Until clean alternatives are well-established and clearly attractive to private investors, it would not 
appear an appropriate time to open the generation market up. 
                                                     
6 See for example, A Weissman (2004) ‘The Current Natural Gas Supply Crisis and Options for Fueling Electric 
Generation’ North American Power Markets Conference, Toronto, Canada, January 28, 2004. 
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7. Will market signals be sufficient to generate the required investment? 
After an initial call for tenders for about 3000MW to be allocated by a competitive process, the 
government’s proposals appear to be based on market signals to stimulate the necessary investment. This 
raises two issues: are there private investors willing to invest in new generation; and, if there are, under what 
terms would they be willing to invest? 
7.1. Are there private investors? 
Four or five years ago, this question would have appeared trivial. Many US utilities, such as TXU, Reliant, 
Mirant, Enron, AES, AEP, Edison Mission and NRG were expanding outside the USA, and European 
companies, such as EDF, Endesa, Tractebel, RWE and E.ON were also looking to develop markets outside 
their home bases. However, experience with these international ventures has often been economically 
disastrous. Some of the US companies (Mirant and Enron) collapsed, while all the others are withdrawing to 
their home markets. The European companies, generally larger than the US companies, have scarcely done 
better and few if any are now looking to expand outside Europe. 
It is unclear when, or even if, utilities will again begin to look at investments outside their existing markets. 
It may be that Canada will be regarded as a sufficiently low risk market that some of the large European and 
US utilities will at least contemplate investing in Ontario, but it is by no means certain. If international 
investors were not likely to enter at least in the short-term, that would place the burden solely on Canadian 
companies, such as TransAlta, TransCanada, Fortis and Atco and an assessment needs to be made to see if 
national sources can provide the volume of investment required efficiently. At this stage, a large number of 
companies both from inside and outside Canada have expressed an interest in investing in Ontario, but such 
expressions of interest are almost cost-free and should not be taken as an indication that real investment 
decisions will be forthcoming. 
7.2. What terms will investors require? 
Assuming that, in principle, there are investors willing to invest in power generation in Ontario, the next 
issue is under what terms? The Minister’s statement implies that the wholesale electricity market would 
continue as at present. If there is something approaching a competitive market, this would make investment 
in new generation a risky venture. Those investing in power plants that sold into the wholesale market 
(merchant plants) would not know from one day to the next how much power they would sell and at what 
price. Investing sums in the region of C$1bn with so few guarantees would be intolerably risky or would be 
possible only with a large risk premium on investment that would make the power produced very expensive. 
One way to reduce risk would be for a new generator to sign a power purchase agreement with a retail 
company. However, if the retail market is to be genuinely competitive, no retailer will be able to forecast 
their sales far in advance. Either the retail market would be a sham or any power purchase contract 
sufficiently long-term to allow the finance of a new power plant (10 years or more) would probably not be 
worth the paper it was written on. 
Experience from the British market illustrates these points. At the end of 2003, 40 per cent of the generating 
capacity in Britain was owned by companies that were financially near collapse, had been repossessed by the 
banks that had lent money to purchase them or was for sale at distress prices. About half of this capacity was 
nuclear, while the rest was coal and gas-fired power plants, in the latter case, often of modern technology. 
In addition, while the National Grid Company, which owns the transmission network is able to make good 
profits on a (regulated) real annual rate of return of 6.25 per cent, it is widely accepted that those investing in 
power stations apply a real discount rate of at least 15 per cent. For a power station costing about C$1/kW of 
installed capacity (a typical price for a modern gas-fired plant), this could add about 2c/kWh to the cost of 
production and much more for capital intensive options such as nuclear power. 
8. What if market signals do not generate enough new capacity? 
If sufficient capacity is not built simply through market signals, the Ontario Power Authority would be 
required to carry out some process, such as setting up competitive bidding, to commission the construction of 
the required new capacity. In return for the winning company agreeing to supply power at its bid price, the 
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authority would have to sign a long-term power purchase agreement specifying the volumes that would be 
purchased and price paid. Dwight Duncan has been unclear on whether long-term contracts would be 
awarded. In February 2004, he stated long-term contracts would not be awarded, but later retracted this and 
said no decision had been taken. This uncertainty has meant that as of July 2004, TransAlta was not going to 
bid in the 2500MW RFP and Atco was undecided. In order to finance a new power plant, the developer 
would need a ‘bankable’ commitment that ensured a minimum amount of power was purchased at a 
specified price. It is inconceivable that a bidding company would be bound to a bid price and volume if a 
similarly strong agreement to purchase the power at the agreed price was not signed. 
This ‘back-stop’ position raises two issues. First, would any company invest in generation through any 
mechanism other than this one? If not, the system would essentially revert to being a centrally planned one 
but without the flexibility of the traditional structure. Second, will it be possible for the Ontario Power 
Authority to identify in time when capacity would be needed? A third issue, even if there is theoretically 
sufficient capacity available, can there be any assurance that it will be available to generate power for 
Ontario rather than exporting it to the USA is covered in section 10, which covers the international trading 
regime. 
8.1. Would Ontario Power Authority purchases come to dominate the system? 
On the first issue, if the Ontario Power Authority identified a need for new capacity it would probably hold 
some sort of bidding contest, such as the Ontario government is holding now, to identify the cheapest option. 
This would reduce the investment risk to the company building the plant, but how would the power that was 
purchased in this way be allocated to the market? Would all retailers be required to purchase some of this 
power, perhaps pro rata according to their market share? The more power that was purchased in this way, the 
less scope there would be for competition between retailers. 
As argued above, so-called merchant plants, in other words plants that buy and sell into the spot market 
without substantial contractual cover, would command a large risk premium on investment. Merchant plants 
could not compete with plants commissioned by the Ontario Power Authority, which would have fixed long-
term contracts and the more power that was built under commission from the Ontario Power Authority, the 
less market there would be available for merchant plants to compete in. The nuclear plants are largely 
inflexible physically and would be base-load price-takers, in other words they would have to bid low to 
ensure they were dispatched and would have to accept whatever price the market generated. The hydro 
plants, with minimal operating costs, would easily out-compete fossil-fired stations. So the market for new 
merchant plants would be even more restricted. 
In this situation, it seems likely that potential investors would not build merchant plants and would take the 
much less risky option of waiting for the Ontario Power Authority to identify plant need and competing in 
the contests set up by the Ontario Power Authority. Ultimately, this would mean that the system was 
dominated by plant built under commission from the Ontario Power Authority (and nuclear plants). This 
would then raise the issue of flexibility. If the plant commissioned by the Ontario Power Authority had fixed 
power purchase agreements, which plant would provide the flexibility necessary in an electricity system to 
accommodate the large daily swings in electricity demand? 
8.2. Can the Ontario Power Authority identify plant need in time? 
The second issue seems trivial on the face of it. In a traditional centrally planned system, it is relatively easy 
in principle (if not always in practice) to forecast supply and demand and identify shortages well in advance. 
However, in a free market, things are much less predictable. Many developers take out what are effectively 
‘options’ on sites, applying for permissions etc, without making a full financial commitment. 
In a free market, there is free exit and entry, and experience suggests neither is predictable. In order for new 
capacity to be brought on-line, a shortage would have to be predicted at least five years ahead to allow new 
plant to gain planning authorisation, for equipment to be ordered and construction to take place. Many 
projects that are announced are not completed or are completed much later than originally forecast. 
This point is clearly illustrated by experience in Europe. At the start of 2004, 12.6GW of generation projects 
were fully authorised in Italy (in a system with installed capacity of about 80GW), and a further 44GW of 
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projects had industry ministry approval.7 In Britain, a large volume of projects has also been announced and 
it is difficult to forecast which plants will be built and when. It is therefore not clear how a planning authority 
could forecast what proportion of these projects would actually go ahead and on what time scale. 
Market exit is equally unpredictable. In 2002, there was a large enough surplus of generating plant in Britain 
to provoke steep wholesale price reductions sufficient to lead to the financial collapse of a significant 
proportion of generating companies including the nuclear company, British Energy. This lead to a large scale 
market exit so that by summer 2003, it was necessary for the National Grid Company (the transmission 
system operator) to call for extra capacity to be brought on line to prevent power shortages in that winter. 
Unless strong restrictions on market entry, requiring entrants to stick to a construction schedule on pain of 
tough penalties once approvals had been received, are imposed, and restrictions requiring existing generators 
to give several years notice of exit are introduced, predicting the scale and timing of capacity shortages 
would be impossible. Such restrictions would probably be unworkable and would certainly make a mockery 
of the attempts to create a ‘free’ wholesale market. 
8.3. European experience 
The Ontario reforms on new capacity shadow closely the recently revised European Union Electricity 
Directive8, passed in July 2003. In this, Member States were encouraged to adopt an ‘authorisation process’ 
for new plants, in other words, there would be no planning hurdles for new power plants to pass other than 
the normal planning procedures for any industrial facility. However, the Commission is becoming 
increasingly concerned about security of supply and in paragraph 23 of the Directive, the Commission states: 
‘In the interest of security of supply, the supply/demand balance in individual Member States should be monitored, 
and monitoring should be followed by a report on the situation at Community level, taking account of 
interconnection capacity between areas. Such monitoring should be carried out sufficiently early to enable 
appropriate measures to be taken if security of supply is compromised.’ 
 In the Notes9 to the Directive, the Commission states: 
‘However, Member States should ensure the possibility to contribute to security of supply through the launching of a 
tendering procedure or an equivalent procedure in the event that sufficient electricity generation capacity is not built 
on the basis of the authorisation procedure. 
Member States shall ensure the monitoring of security of supply issues. Where Member States consider it 
appropriate they may delegate this task to the regulatory authorities referred to in Article 23(1). This monitoring 
shall, in particular, cover the supply/demand balance on the national market, the level of expected future demand 
and envisaged additional capacity being planned or under construction, and the quality and level of maintenance of 
the networks, as well as measures to cover peak demand and to deal with shortfalls of one or more suppliers. The 
competent authorities shall publish every two years, by 31 July at the latest, a report outlining the findings resulting 
from the monitoring of these issues, as well as any measures taken or envisaged to address them and shall forward 
this report to the Commission forthwith.’ 
The Commission does recognise the dangers of such an approach and notes: 
‘The Commission submits that the tendering procedure has the advantage of being relatively easy to organise and 
will ensure that investors will actually construct the capacity tendered (as opposed to the authorisation procedure 
where the grant of an authorisation is no guarantee that the capacity authorised will be built). However, the 
tendering option equally gives rise to a number of important [concerns] which should be considered by Member 
States:  
• Launching a tendering procedure constitutes an intervention on the market from the part of the authorities; 
• Such a procedure, as is the case with other interventions, distorts the investment signals that exist in the 
market and could lead to ‘a wait for the tender to be launched’ approach on the part of investors. 
The consequences of launching a tender in peripheral markets will tend to be more limited to the national markets. 
However, launching a tender in a non-peripheral Member State does not only cause an intervention on the market in 
                                                     
7 Power in Europe, 1 March 2004. 




23/08/2004  Page 11 of 21  
  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
the country in question, but might also lead to disparities on the internal market regarding Member States that rely 
on different measures to ensure security of supply.’ 
Despite its concern about market interventions, the Commission then lists a range of market interventions 
Member States could take to prevent capacity shortages. These include: 
- Keeping capacity standby for reserve purposes. A central authority would be required to contract for reserve 
capacity to meet peaks; 
- Capacity payments. Generators would be paid for having capacity available; 
- Capacity requirements. Retail suppliers would be obliged to buy reserve capacity; 
- Reliability contracts. The transmission system operator is required to buy ‘call options’ from generators; 
- Capacity subscriptions. Each customer must buy a capacity fuse from a generator that limits his or her 
consumption; 
- Long-term contracts. Retail suppliers would be obliged to enter long-term contracts with generators. 
There is no space to review each of these possibilities individually, all have serious shortcomings, but it is 
clear that eight years after the first EU Electricity Directive was passed, the European Commission is 
increasingly concerned that the market will not ensure supply and demand balance and that strong non-
market interventions are needed to ensure supply and demand do balance. 
9. How would the new market differ from the earlier market? 
The key difference between the new proposals and the old, failed market appears to be the role of the Ontario 
Power Authority in ensuring generation capacity adequacy. Other changes seem to amount to no more than 
renaming agencies and moving responsibilities from one agency to another. On retail competition, medium 
and large consumers would again have free choice while small consumers could choose between a regulated 
rate and buying from independent retailers. However, all consumers would ultimately be exposed to the 
wholesale market price. Small consumers would pay a rate based on monopoly charges, contracted 
generation costs and a forecast of market prices. If the forecast proves wrong, it seems likely that the 
companies would be able to recover any under-forecasting from consumers in the following year. 
10. The free trade context 
The proposals cannot be considered just as internal to the province of Ontario; the wider North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), established in 1994 and the World Trade Organisation’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have to be considered.10 The issues surrounding GATS are 
complex and the failure of the Cancun summit in September 2003 has delayed the implementation of GATS, 
but there is little question of the GATS proposals being withdrawn. 
10.1. The GATS process 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) replaced the GATT organisation on free trade agreements in 1994. 
Ministerial Conferences are the top-most decision-making body under the WTO and these conferences must 
take place at least once every two years. The Cancun meeting was the most recent Ministerial Conference. 
The Marrakech agreement came at the end of the ‘Uruguay Round’ of trade negotiations (1986-94) under 
which, for the first time, the agenda was broadened to include commodities other than ‘goods’ under trade 
agreements. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was part of the Marrakech Agreement. 
Signatories to the Marrakech Agreement (including Canada) are committed under GATS to progressively 
open their service sectors to international entry and liberalisation. A new ‘round’ of negotiations on services 
                                                     
10 For a fuller account of the issues surrounding NAFTA and GATS, and the electricity industry, see, S Shrybman 
(2001) ‘A legal opinion concerning the impact of international trade disciplines on the privatization and restructuring of 
Ontario’s electricity sector’ Sack Goldblatt Mitchell, Ottawa, Marjorie Griffin Cohen, ‘From Public Good to Private 
Exploitation: GATS and the Restructuring of Canadian Electrical Utilities,’ Canadian American Public Policy, no 28, 
December 2001, pp. 1-79, Marjorie Griffin Cohen "Imperialist Regulation: US Electricity Market Designs and their 
Problems for Canada and Mexico" Forthcoming in Ricardo Grinspun, ed. "The Slippery Slope: Canada, Free Trade and 
Deep Integration in North America" (Montreal/Kingston: McGill/Queens Press, 2004), S Thomas, I R Rajepakse, & J 
Gunasekara (2003) ‘Turning off the lights: GATS and the threat to community electricity’ Intermediate Technology 
Development Group, Bourton on Dunsmore, and Pierre-Olivier Pineau ‘Electricity Services in the GATS and the 
FTAA’, Energy Studies Review, vol. 12 (2), Spring 2004. 
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started in 2000 and under the Doha agreement of 2001 (the Ministerial Conference prior to Cancun), is 
scheduled to end on January 1, 2005.  
Given that energy is such a major service both in terms of its economic significance and also its importance 
to consumers, there is surprisingly little reference to energy in the GATS classification of services. Under the 
GATS agreement, 12 categories of service are identified and within each of these broad categories, there are 
a number of subcategories, which are broken down even further. In all, there are several hundred 
subcategories. Energy appears only once amongst these subcategories as ‘services incidental to energy 
distribution’, which is one of 20 sectors within the ‘Other business services’ category of ‘business services’. 
‘Services incidental to energy distribution’ appears a rather limited set of activities, implying consultancy 
activities. However, reference to a more detailed classification (the United National Provisional Central Product 
Classification) reveals that it includes core distribution and transmission activities. Indeed, the USA and the EU 
are proposing that electricity generation be included in this category as a service under GATS. Classifying it as 
a ‘good’ would bring it under the general GATT agreement. Negotiations are now underway to define energy 
as a separate sector and resolve how electricity generation should be classified. 
Under the GATS, service sectors are to be opened under a system of ‘request and offer’. Members are 
required to ‘offer’ to open service sectors up and were required to make an initial ‘offer’ to open up activities 
by March 31 2003. Members can make a ‘request’ to another member to open a sector and the GATS 
agreement stated initial requests should be made by June 30, 2002. The response to the initial timetable was 
poor, and by June 12, 2003, only 26 members of the WTO had made offers. The response on requests is not 
easy to estimate because these requests are made bilaterally with no requirement to inform the WTO. A hint 
of the nature of the request process was given when the EU’s list of requests was leaked to the public. 
Requests were made to 109 members of the WTO in twelve sectors, including energy. In about 40 per cent of 
the cases (46), the EU requested an opening of the energy sector. Compared to most other sectors, especially, 
for example, telecoms (106 out of 109), the number of requests to open up the energy sector was lower. 
Commitments made under GATS must be taken very seriously. Once a country has made a commitment to 
open a sector, there is little scope to withdraw it. The GATS process is being carried out in a very secretive 
way. Industrialised countries have not made their requests public, and developing country governments are 
unwilling to open up the process to public debate, despite the far-reaching consequences of a decision to 
open up an activity. For example, the heading of the EU request to each country states ‘Member States are 
requested to ensure that this text is not made publicly available and is treated as a restricted document’. 
The WTO protests that it is no part of the GATS agenda to force countries to liberalise and privatise its 
service industries, but this is disingenuous given that written into the GATS is a commitment by WTO 
member governments to progressively liberalise trade in services. The two major trading blocs, the USA and 
the EU, are clearly using the GATS negotiations to pressure countries to privatise and liberalise their energy 
sectors. In its communication to the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services of March 2003, the EU stated11: 
‘The recent experiences of liberalisation in some energy sectors and the already well established presence of third 
country suppliers in other sectors like oil and gas, are showing the way for a win-win opening up of national markets 
to competition and to foreign suppliers.’ 
A US communication to the Council for Trade in Services (December 2000) stated: 
‘Competitive conditions in a nation’s energy services markets enhance the competitiveness of domestic energy 
consumers as well as incentives for foreign investors to invest in both energy services and energy-consuming 
sectors. They also can benefit residential consumers and social services, as well as employment, through the 
beneficial impact on energy-dependent services and manufacturing sectors.’ 
So far, it does not appear that Canada has made any commitments on electricity to the WTO. 
                                                     
11 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm  
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10.2. NAFTA 
The provisions of NAFTA on services are similar to those required under GATS, but potentially more 
powerful.12 Whereas under GATS, the national government is required to make a specific commitment to 
open a sector before its rules can be invoked by those seeking access to that sector, under NAFTA, once the 
sector is open, NAFTA rules apply without the need for an explicit government commitment. Of particular 
concern under NAFTA are provisions that prohibit import and export controls, and all forms of border price 
regulation. Thus if there is a shortage of power in Ontario, the government is prohibited from taking 
measures to restrict exports. 
As with GATS, NAFTA does not by itself prescribe privatisation and liberalisation, but once the door is 
open, it is effectively impossible to go back. Foreign companies are entitled to ‘national treatment’ under 
NAFTA, in other words, they must be treated at least as well as national companies. However, if Canadian 
provinces choose to retain a publicly owned integrated structure, there are no provisions under NAFTA that 
would make it change. 
10.3. Overall impact 
NAFTA and GATS mean that any efforts by provincial authorities to plan the electricity system, for example 
by ensuring that supply and demand balance, cannot be effective. Under GATS and NAFTA reforms are 
irreversible and if the reforms fail, it will be impossible for the provincial government to take control of the 
sector again and re-introduce a planned approach. 
If ‘merchant plants’ are built, trade agreements will mean that the Ontario Power Authority cannot assume 
that plant sited in Ontario will be available to Ontario. If the price of power is higher in connected markets, 
there will be no way to prevent such plants exporting their output, so even though there might nominally be 
enough capacity in Ontario, there can be no guarantee it will be available for Ontario. If as seems likely, no 
new merchant plants are built and the market is dominated by plants contracted to the Ontario Power 
Authority, these will be likely to be available to Ontario, although the existing hydro and nuclear plants may 
choose not to be contracted and ‘play’ the market. At best, this would lead to very high prices as and at 
worst, power shortages. 
The precise implications of NAFTA and particularly GATS are far from clear. At present, at least until it is 
clear that any reforms to the electricity industry have been successful, the most prudent policy for the 
Canadian government would seem to be to make no commitments under GATS and to invoke any 
protections available under NAFTA for the integrated publicly owned provincial systems.  
11. What will be the impact on prices 
There is approximately 3400MW of nuclear plant shut down that must be either refurbished or replaced in 
the next few years, while Bruce A units 3 & 4, Pickering B and Bruce B may only have a few years of 
operation left before refurbishment is required. The costs of refurbishing the five closed nuclear units is 
likely to be of the order C$5bn, significantly more than the cost of building new gas plants, which might be 
expected to cost about C$700-800/kW (C$2.5bn). If 7500MW of coal plant is retired and replaced with the 
option with lowest construction costs, gas-fired plant, this will cost an additional C$5bn, and perhaps more if 
other options are chosen. The decisions on nuclear refurbishment and coal plant retirement are political ones 
that should be taken by the Ontario people. The decisions on nuclear are urgent. 
If the coal plant is retired, there will be a need for in excess of C$10bn investment in the next 3-4 years and, 
however this investment is carried out, this could result in higher prices for consumers. To the extent that old 
power plants, especially the coal plants, for which the capital costs have long been written off will be 
replaced by new plants that must repay their construction costs, it seems likely this will place upward 
pressure on prices. However, new plant, especially gas-fired plant is likely to be more technically efficient 
this may counterbalance the impact of the recovery of the investment cost of the new plant. 
                                                     
12 For an analysis of the impact of NAFTA on the electricity sector, see G Horlick, C Schuchhardt & H Mann (2001) 
‘NAFTA provisions and the electricity sector’ Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Background paper, 
Montreal. http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/nfta5-final_EN.pdf  
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The issue to be determined is which method of operating the sector will meet this investment need at lowest 
cost to the consumer. It is likely that a competitive solution will put pressure on companies to minimise their 
costs. However, competition cannot exist without risk and there is always a cost if the market is asked to bear 
risk, most clearly in the form of a risk premium on investment. For a capital intensive industry such as 
electricity the likely doubling or more of the required rate of return on capital required will significantly raise 
costs and it seems implausible that efficiency savings will pay for this huge additional cost. 
However, as argued above, it seems likely that most plant will be built under commission from the Ontario 
Power Authority and will be given long-term contracts. For foreign investors, there will be some currency 
risk and there will also be a ‘technological’ risk. If the plant is not built to time and cost, or if it is not as 
reliable as forecast, there will be substantial extra costs that cannot be recovered from consumers and, again, 
there will be a risk premium on investment. There will also be the bidding risk that the cost of making the 
bid (see below) will be lost if the bid is unsuccessful. Of course this will be an incentive to complete plants 
to time and cost and run them efficiently but whether the improved performance this might bring will pay for 
the extra risk is far from clear. 
The final issue is whether private companies can invest more cheaply than publicly owned companies. 
Generally, government owned companies have a very high credit rating and their cost of borrowing is 
correspondingly low and probably lower than for private companies. There is often an assumption that 
privately owned companies are more efficient than publicly owned companies. There is no general evidence 
to support this in the electricity sector and, for example, the price of power provided by publicly owned 
companies in the USA is generally somewhat lower than the cost of power from investor-owned utilities. 
Clearly, OPG has suffered from cost control problems with the refurbishment of Pickering but there is no 
evidence that these problems cannot be dealt with by better management of the company by the provincial 
authorities. Of course, if OPG is prevented from bidding, any improvements in its efficiency will have no 
impact on the cost of constructing new capacity. 
12. Will the call for tenders work? 
The new proposals will stand or fall on the success of the current call for tenders. This is looking for 300MW 
of renewable capacity and 2500MW of ‘clean’ projects to be in service by mid-2007 for demand side bids 
and 2009 for new generation. OPG is specifically excluded from bidding for the renewable capacity and 
cannot be the lead organisation on a ‘clean’ bid.13 
12.1. New ‘clean’ generation 
Generation plants must be ‘clean’ plants of more than 5MW. However, natural gas plants, which do emit 
acid and greenhouse gases, are allowed and while emissions are much less than for a coal-fired plant, the 
designation ‘clean’ is somewhat dubious. In practice, it seems likely, if experience in other liberalised 
markets is anything to go by, that the cheapest bids will be combined cycle gas-fired plants, perhaps with 
some use of waste heat. The winning bids must expect to be in service by June 2009 and contracts will run 
until December 31, 2027. The contract guarantees to cover the bid prices from the bidder through what is 
effectively a ‘contract for differences’. In other words, if the income from the market is below the bid price, 
the Ontario Power Authority pays the bidder the difference and vice versa. Note that the operating costs 
include gas price indexation so the prices are not fixed. If the gas price goes up, the cost of power will also 
go up. Under this form of contract, the bidder takes no commercial risk; the price they receive is guaranteed 
whatever the market conditions. 
12.2. Demand reduction (DR) 
Demand reduction measures, which would come into operation when the market price exceeded a specified 
level, must be in operation by end 2007, must be available for at least five years and must reduce demand by 
at least 5MW. Again, there must be some question about their designation as ‘clean’. While reducing peaks 
may be economically worthwhile, if the proposals merely shift demand away from peak to another lower 
                                                     
13 The official documentation on the 2500MW RFP states: ‘Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG) will be instructed by 
its shareholder that it shall not directly participate as a sole Proponent in the 2,500 MW RFP. OPG may be permitted to 
participate as a member of a Proponent Team, provided that the Proponent is not controlled by OPG. 
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demand period, this may simply reduce the loading on a peaking fossil-fuel plant and increase the loading on 
a mid-load fossil-fuel plant. The payment in the first year of operation will be C$200/MWh. Thereafter, 
payments will be made under a form of contracts for differences. 
12.3. Demand side management (DSM) 
As with demand reduction, proposals must be for at least 5MW and be available for at least five years. Since 
these will lead to real savings in use of fossil fuel use, it is appropriate to designate these as ‘clean’ options. 
Projects must have a payback of more than three years (presumably, projects with a shorter payback might 
be expected not to need any support) and the contract will reduce the payback time to three years. 
12.4. Green generation 
Renewable projects must be between 0.5-100MW and must be in service by end 2007. They will be awarded 
a 20 year contract paying the bid price with some scope for additional incentive payments. 
12.5. What proportion of projects will be completed? 
Clearly, the 2500MW and 300MW of capacity requested will be the upper limit of the amount of capacity 
built under the current call for tenders and some of the plant will not be built. There is a difficult balance to 
be struck between requiring strong assurances that plant that is selected is built and not placing unreasonable 
demands on plant developers. Similar processes in Britain produced impressive results in terms of prices bid, 
but a significant proportion of plants chosen were not actually completed. 
The Ontario government’s RFP documentation does list guarantees bidders must make, including securities 
of between C$250,000 and C$1,000,000, as well as the technical and commercial credentials required of the 
company. These upfront costs will of course be factored into the bids and will be paid by consumers. A 
company making a bid will, unless it is very certain it will win the contest, be unwilling to risk large sums of 
money obtaining all planning consents and tying up financial backing from financiers. If these prove more 
difficult or expensive than anticipated, it may prove cheaper to surrender the security than proceed with a 
loss-making project. Getting the right level of incentives so that a high proportion of projects selected 
actually proceed to completion is likely to take some tuning and is unlikely to be right first time, so even 
with the RFP process, there is some level of uncertainty about how much plant will actually be built. Note 
that in Britain, a similar process to allow construction of renewable plant saw the completion rate actually 
fall over a period of 8 years and five contests from just over 90 per cent to not much more than 10 per cent.14 
12.6. Evaluation 
Bidding contests of this type can be a valuable way of testing the market to see whether innovative lower 
cost options, not considered by the main companies, are available. However, they are by no means certain to 
deliver the required volume of plant. The more competitive the process, the higher the failure rate is likely to 
be. The demand side measures are relatively short-term (five years) in comparison with the time-frame under 
consideration here and while demand reduction is often economically and environmentally attractive, this 
will have to be an ongoing process. 
The decision not to allow, or to restrict OPG from participating in these contests seems a risky one. While 
there clearly is a risk that OPG will dominate the bidding and perhaps choke off private participation, OPG 
clearly does have financial strength and would also be expected to have a very high completion rate for 
projects. If later it becomes clear that private investors with attractive projects are being inhibited from 
bidding, it might be appropriate to restrict OPG then, but the priority now is to maximise the probability that 
the necessary investment is carried out. 
It is worth noting also that for generation projects, the lead time from launch of process to plant coming on 
line is more than five years, so the Ontario Power Authority will have to be able to forecast available 
capacity and demand six years and more in advance. 
                                                     
14 Hartnell, G., 2003. Renewable Energy Development 1990–2003. RPA, London. 
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13. Retail competition 
In Ontario, before restructuring, there were a large number of distribution companies operating the local 
network and retailing power to final consumers. Most were publicly owned by municipalities with Ontario 
Hydro supplying directly those not covered by local distribution companies. Under the 2002 reforms, the 
municipal utilities became for-profit companies, although ownership could remain with the local authorities 
and these companies were required to continue to supply residential consumers that did not choose a new 
supplier under regulated ‘standard supply service’ terms that included indexing to the wholesale market. 
Retail competition was suspended in November 2002. The new proposals are basically the same as the old 
ones with small consumers able to choose a regulated tariff with pass-through of wholesale electricity prices. 
In some respects, retail competition should have little economic impact on consumers. The network charges 
should be standard, while if the wholesale market is working well, the wholesale cost of power should be 
about the same to all retailers. This just leaves the retailers’ own costs to compete over. For very large 
consumers of electricity, even a small percentage cut in electricity charges may be worth having.15 
Before retail competition was introduced for small consumers in Britain, retailers’ costs (billing, meter 
reading) accounted for less than 10 per cent of a typical small consumer’s bill. However, in a competitive 
system, there are major additional costs for the retailer. These include advertising, marketing, the technical 
cost of switching a customer from one company to another – in Britain, the cost of simply transferring a 
consumer from one supplier to another is in excess of C$100. The activity of buying electricity on the 
wholesale market is also a major job requiring skilled commodity traders. Now in Britain, the retailer’s costs, 
excluding metering, make up about 30 per cent of a typical residential consumer’s bill. It seems highly 
unlikely that the ‘magic’ of competition will be strong enough to pay for these extra costs. 
There are additional problems of equity between classes of consumer. It is clear that medium and large 
consumers will have the incentive and the skills to exploit the market to the maximum changing supplier 
frequently to ensure they get the cheapest power. However, small consumers do not have the skills and many 
seem uncomfortable ‘experimenting’ with such a vital purchase. Switching rates amongst small consumers 
are generally low in the countries that do have retail competition and in Britain, there is evidence that there 
are a small number ‘serial’ switchers and a large number who will never switch. The ‘switchers’ probably 
cause retailers large losses with profits well below the cost of acquisition, while the non-switchers are largely 
insensitive to costs. This is a recipe for exploitation.  
In Britain, when the retail supply market was only open for medium and large consumers, the electricity 
retailers systematically allocated their cheapest wholesale purchases to the captive market with the 
consequence that small consumers paid 30 per cent more for the generation element of their bill (generation 
then made up about half the total bill). Things got worse for small consumers after retail competition was 
introduced for them in 1998/99. After then, the companies were effectively free to charge small consumers 
whatever the market would bear. In the period 1999-2002, the wholesale electricity price was reported to 
have fallen by about 40 per cent in Britain, yet small consumers actually paid 5 per cent more for their 
generation and large consumers only saw a reduction of about 20 per cent. 
Within residential consumers, there may well be discrimination. Competing retailers will tend to target their 
marketing at the largest consumers. Poor consumers who have difficulty in paying their bill will not be 
attractive. In Britain, those who pay their bill by Direct Debit (a fixed sum taken directly from their bank 
account) are offered lower rates than those the poorest consumers who pay via pre-payment meters (more 
than 15 per cent of consumers in Britain pay for their electricity in this way). 
The new proposals for Ontario seem closest to the former position in Britain when small consumers could 
not choose their supplier and whose tariffs were fully regulated. As noted above, these regulated tariffs did 
not protect them from being exploited by the companies. International experience suggests consumers will 
stick with their existing supplier. Unless there is strict regulation, the retailers will have little alternative but 
to allocate their cheapest power to the large consumers to protect their market share there, leaving small 
consumers with the high cost power. 
                                                     
15 For large consumers, the economic benefits may come from shifting demand away from expensive periods as much 
as from a cheaper kWh price. 
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One other factor that should not be ignored is any locational effect. Britain is a small, densely populated 
country where very few consumers live far from demand centres. If a significant number of consumers in 
Ontario live in remote locations that are more expensive to supply, there is a risk that in a competitive 
market, such consumers would not be attractive to competing suppliers and would receive a poor and/or 
expensive service. If the political judgement is that electricity is a vital service that should be available to all 
no broadly comparable terms, regulatory measures will be necessary to ensure remotely situated consumers 
are not disadvantaged. 
14. Conclusions 
Ontario is faced with a need to make major investments in its electricity sector in the next 3-4 years to 
replace or refurbish old plant and to meet demand growth. The solution proposed by the current Ontario 
government has much in common with that of the previous administration, relying on a wholesale power 
market, retail competition and on private sector investment in new generating capacity. Such a recipe has a 
mixed and often poor track record in other countries and other provinces of Canada. It therefore seems an 
unduly risky strategy to abandon a structure, the vertically integrated, publicly owned monopoly company, 
with a long track record of successfully meeting demand. One attempt at reform failed within months of its 
introduction and the new system inherits many of its characteristics, including a wholesale market, retail 
competition and free entry to new generators. The major difference is the creation of the Ontario Power 
Authority to monitor supply and demand and with the powers to commission the construction of new 
capacity if it foresees a shortage. However, it seems unlikely that the Ontario Power Authority will be able to 
foresee shortages accurately, nor will it be able to act in time and there is also a serious risk that too low a 
proportion of the capacity it commissions will actually be completed. 
It is recommended that the Ontario government takes the following steps: 
14.1. Wholesale competition 
The illusion that wholesale competition can be created should be abandoned. Experience in other countries 
suggests that wholesale electricity markets only work well (as measured by downward pressure on prices) 
when there is surplus capacity. For example, the NordPool system that covers the Nordic markets seems to 
have operated smoothly for nearly a decade but it has had the advantage of a surplus of capacity. It has not so 
far stimulated any significant investment in new generating capacity and, unless it does soon, a shortage of 
capacity may emerge.16 
Wholesale markets do not seem to stimulate new investment and in systems with a major investment need, 
such as California and Brazil, attempts to introduce wholesale competition have been disastrous. In all 
wholesale markets, the risk of market manipulation seems high and in the UK, for a decade after the reforms 
were introduced, the wholesale price was kept high by the behaviour of a few large generators. These high 
prices ensured there was ample incentive for new generators to enter and maintain surplus capacity. Now the 
wholesale market in Britain is largely bypassed as the generation companies now own all the retailers and 
generate power for their own consumers, not the market. 
Under the present proposals for Ontario, it seems likely that few if any plants will be built to compete in the 
market and, in the words of the European Commission, companies will adopt ‘a wait for the tender to be 
launched’ approach. This would result in a semi-planned system, but without the advantage of being able to 
control entry and exit. Without this ability to control entry and exit, balancing supply and demand will be 
very difficult. 
A more suitable system would be perhaps to adopt a ‘single buyer’ model. Under this, a public agency, such 
as the proposed Ontario Power Authority would be given the responsibility to procure the province’s power 
needs and ensure that the province had access to enough capacity to meet its own needs. It could use a 
variety of instruments such as power purchase contracts of varying durations, and contests to build new 
                                                     
16 A large new nuclear plant was ordered in 2004 in Finland, but this is a very specific case. It will be owned largely by 
an association of industrial consumers that operates largely out of the market supplying only its members and is not-for-
profit. 
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capacity to ensure power was purchased at the lowest cost consistent with supply security, environmental 
protection and any other relevant strategic considerations. 
14.2. Gas resources 
A review of the adequacy of the gas resources available to Canada and, Ontario in particular, needs to be 
undertaken if it is expected that a significant proportion of new capacity built will be gas-fired. 
14.3. International trade agreements 
Clarification is urgently needed on what measures are allowed under the NAFTA and GATS trade regimes. 
If, as seems likely, it becomes clear that untested reforms such as those proposed by the Ontario government 
will be effectively irreversible under these agreements, this reinforces the warning that untested reforms, 
especially those that are likely to result in privatisation and the end of sector planning, should not be 
undertaken. The Government of Ontario should lobby the Federal government to ensure that no 
commitments are made under GATS and all possible protections from the free trade model under NAFTA 
are taken up. 
14.4. Retail competition 
Attempts to introduce retail competition should be abandoned. Experience elsewhere suggests that large 
consumers will profit but only at the expense of small consumers if large consumers are given choice. If 
retail competition is extended to all consumers, the poorest consumers will be at risk of having to pay the 
highest prices. 
14.5. The role of the publicly-owned companies 
The government’s proposals prevent Ontario Power Generation from participating strongly in the 
construction of new generating plants. Given the huge investment needs, the high likelihood that plant being 
built by OPG would be completed and the doubts about the appetite of foreign investors to make investments 
in the electricity sector outside their home markets, this seems an unnecessarily restrictive strategy. 
14.6. Privatisation 
Regardless of the merits of privatisation, the lack of international investors makes any attempt to privatise or 
break up companies such as OPG and Hydro One unwise. The selling price would probably be far below the 
real value of the businesses. Until and unless the privatised liberalised electricity industry model is much 
better proven, efforts should be concentrated on improving the management (both internal and by the Ontario 
government) of the publicly owned assets so that they are able to make investments and operate existing 
assets efficiently. This would include ensuring that the publicly-owned companies have access to sufficient 
investment funds to meet their investment needs. 
14.7. The coal and nuclear power plants 
Important decisions need to be taken urgently on the future of coal-fired and nuclear generating plants in 
Ontario. While there is flexibility in the closure dates of the coal-fired plants, there is much less flexibility 
with the nuclear plants, which must either be retired or refurbished when their pressure tubes no longer meet 
the standards required by the safety authorities. These decisions are for the Ontario people to take through 
clear, democratic processes. 
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Annex Liberalisation in Europe 
The European Union Electricity Directive of 2003 (2003/54/EC)17 seems to prescribe complete liberalisation 
of Member States’ electricity industries, requiring full retail competition, legal separation of network 
companies from companies generating or selling electricity, and appointment of a sector regulator. The 
Directive, agreed by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on July 2003 required 
that Member States transpose its provisions into national law by July 1 2004. In practice, of the 25 Member 
States, only the Netherlands and Slovenia met this dead-line, although Denmark, Hungary and Lithuania are 
reported to be close to completing the process. None of the five largest Member States met the deadline. 
Other countries may pass the necessary laws later in 2004 while some will not complete the legislation until 
2005. The European Commission will also have to consider whether these law changes do actually represent 
the requirements of the Directive. The Table shows that amongst the five largest Member States, only Britain 
appears to be complying fully (if not legislatively) with the letter and the spirit of the Directive. 
While Germany introduced retail competition in 1998, in practice very few small consumers have switched. 
The two dominant companies, RWE and E.ON own a large part of the network and are required only to grant 
access to third-party companies through Negotiated Third Party Access (NTPA), rather than Regulated Third 
Party Access (RTPA), which ensures third-party companies have access to the network at published, non-
discriminatory prices. No sector regulator has been appointed and plans to introduce one, with legal powers, 
have now been delayed until 2005. The two largest companies own or control a large number of subsidiaries 
and their dominance of generation and retail is much fuller than the figures in the Table imply. 
The French system is dominated by the nationally-owned utility, Electricité de France (EDF), which still 
owns the network and has about 80 per cent of the generation and retail markets. Retail competition for small 
consumers is not expected until 2007, the latest date allowed under the Directive. In Italy, retail competition 
and a wholesale electricity market have only recently been introduced and ENEL, the part privatised national 
electric utility still has a strong hold on generation and retail. Spain, like Germany is essentially a duopoly 
with Endesa and Iberdrola controlling about 80 per cent of the wholesale and retail markets. 
By contrast, Britain seems to have complied fully, although closer examination shows the markets are far 
from perfect. The industry is dominated by three large European companies (EDF, RWE and E.ON) and 
three much weaker British companies. All six companies are generators and retailers so the wholesale market 
is largely bypassed. More than 95 per cent of wholesale electricity sales are through ‘self-dealing’ or long-
term entirely confidential contracts. The power exchange (UKPX) accounts typically for about 0.5 per cent 
of wholesale trades. Britain is one of the few countries that have introduced retail competition where annual 
switching rates are above 10 per cent. However, of the consumers that have switched, most have opted to 
buy electricity as a package with gas from the dominant gas retailer, Centrica. This is despite the fact that for 
most small consumers, the Centrica package represents usually the most expensive offer in the market. It 
seems that consumers are either buying on grounds other than price, or are not able to evaluate the competing 
deals effectively. 
                                                     
17 For the full text, see 
http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/RenderServlet?search=DocNumber&lg=en&nb_docs=25&domain=Legislation&coll
=&in_force=NO&an_doc=2003&nu_doc=54&type_doc=Directive  
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Table   Liberalisation of electricity markets in Europe 
 UK Germany France Italy Spain 
% market open (year 
for 100%) 
100 (1998) 100 (1998) 37 (2007) 66 (2007) 100 (2003) 
Transmission System 
Operator unbundling 
Ownership Legal Management Ownership Ownership 
Distribution System 
Operator unbundling 
Legal Accounts Accounts Legal Legal 
Network access RTPA NTPA RTPA RTPA RTPA 
Regulator staff 
(budget €m) 
300 (57) None: 2005? 96 (12) 104 (19) 187 (21) 
Largest generators’ 
market share 
16 23 78 43 37 
Largest 3 generators’ 
market share 
37 61 86 72 79 
Power exchange 1990 Pool, 
2001 UKPX 
2000 EEX 21.10.2003 
Powernext 
31.3.2004 IPEX 1998 OMEL 
Dominant balancing 
generator 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Switching 2002: 
Large consumers 
15 20 15 15 20 
Switching 2002: 
Small/domestic 
12 5 - - - 
Retailers with more 
than 5% of market 
7 3 1 4 4 
Largest 3 retailers’ 
market share 
62 53 91 72 88 















most of rest 
EDF (integrated) 
totally dominant 















and Union Fenosa 
control most of 
rest 
Source: Directorate General Transport and Energy Working Paper (2004) ‘Third benchmarking report on the 
implementation of the internal electricity and gas market’ Commission of the European Communities 
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